FIRST DIVISION
RAFAELITO
M. GARAYBLAS, G.R. No. 149493
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN,
C.J., Chairperson,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., Mayor CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
of the City of
EMMANUEL SISON, Secretary
to the Mayor,
and Members of the Board of
Regents,
Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila
(PLM), namely: DR. ALEJANDRO
ROCES, ATTY. RAUL I. GOCO,
MR. ALFREDO G. GABOT, ATTY.
AGUINALDO L. MIRAVALLES
and PARALUMAN R. GIRON, ATTY.
MARITES BARRIOS, Legal Officer V
and concurrently Secretary
of the Univer-
sity and to the Board of
Regents, PLM;
MS.
ANGELITA SOLIS, Vice-President
for Finance, PLM and Resident
Auditor, PLM,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court for the nullification of the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 76, in SCA No. Q-00-39944, dismissing the Petition for Injunction
filed by petitioner Rafaelito M. Garayblas for lack of jurisdiction, as well as
the Order dated
The Antecedents
Rafaelito
M. Garayblas was a part-time Professorial Lecturer in the
In 1996, however,
Goco was appointed Philippine Ambassador to
Meantime,
then Vice-Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. was elected as City Mayor of Manila. On
When
apprised of Goco’s appointment to the position, petitioner, through counsel, sent
a letter[6]
to Manila Vice-Mayor Danilo V. Lacuna requesting that “the appointment of Atty.
Goco to the questioned position be not confirmed by the City Council,”
considering that petitioner had been rightfully appointed thereto.
The matter
was referred to the Office of the City Mayor for appropriate action, pursuant
to Section 454(d) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.[7] Petitioner,
through counsel, thereafter sent a letter[8]
addressed to Mayor Atienza dated
On
On February
10, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition[11]
for Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order with Damages against Mayor Atienza; Atty. Sison, the Chairman; as well as
the Members of the Board of Regents; and PLM officers as respondents. Petitioner alleged that:
15) The act of respondent Atienza in appointing
respondent Raul I. Goco as a Member of the Board of Regents of PLM is illegal,
arbitrary, whimsical, capricious and oppressive amounting to grave abuse of
discretion. It is null and void, and
patently illegal because:
a) Petitioner,
by explicit and clear mandate of law, enjoys a fixed term of office beginning
b) Petitioner has still the absolute right to remain
as Member of the Board of Regents of PLM because the word “term” connotes
entitlement to hold the office as a matter of right.
x x x
c) Respondent
Atienza’s act of appointing respondent Goco as Member of the Board of Regents
is null and void because there is no vacant position to which he may be
appointed. Petitioner is still the
rightful and legitimate occupant of the position as a Member of the Board of
Regents representing the faculty up to 2004.
x x x
Since the position of Member of the Board of Regents
representing the faculty is currently occupied by petitioner, the same cannot
be considered vacant, hence, no valid appointment can be made thereto. It is, therefore, a superfluity to state that
the appointment of respondent Goco as Member of the Board of Regents of PLM
representing the faculty is invalid, irregular, ineffective and void from the
very beginning.
16) Even assuming that there is a vacant position
in the membership of the Board of Regents representing the faculty, still
respondent Goco may not be validly appointed thereto because he has not assumed
the position of a faculty since 1993 or thereabouts up to the present.
16.1)
R.A. 4196
explicitly provides that one member must come from the faculty and, respondent
Goco, not being an active member of the PLM faculty, is not qualified to become
a member of the Board of Regents representing the faculty. Admittedly, the appointment of respondent
Goco runs counter to the clear command of R.A. 4196.
Board
of Regents devoid
of
authority to oust or
remove
petitioner
17) The Board of Regents is without authority to
remove or oust petitioner as Member of the Board of Regents representing the
faculty because vacancy occurs:
“x x x
by reason of resignation, death or other incapacity of one or more of its
members, such vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the Mayor of the City
of Manila, x x x.” (Section 4, R.A. 4196) (Underscoring ours)
17.1) Republic Act 4196 categorically states that vacancy
in the membership of the Board of Regents occur only when a member thereof
resigns, dies or otherwise becomes incapacitated to perform the duties and
functions of the office.
17.2) Thus, the petitioner, not having voluntarily
relinquished his position as Member of the Board of Regents nor is he
incapacitated to discharge the duties thereof, thus he may not be validly
removed or ousted by the Board of Regents.
17.3) So also, the Board of Regents is not clothed with the
authority to oust or remove a Member thereof.
Section 6 of R.A. 4196 enumerates the powers and functions of the Board
of Regents and the authority to oust or remove a member of the Board is not
included therein.
17.4) The
removal or ouster
of the petitioner
is highly irregular because the PLM
Charter provides three (3) valid causes for the removal or ouster from the
Board’s membership – resignation, death or incapacity. Petitioner, therefore, may not be validly
removed by the majority votes of the Members of the Board of Regents as it [is]
not one of the grounds enumerated in the law creating the PLM.[12]
Petitioner anchored his action for
damages on the following allegations:
18) Because respondents acted in evident bad faith
with deliberate intention to ridicule, humiliate, dishonor, embarrass and place
petitioner in a shameful predicament, sustained untold sufferings, sleepless
nights, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and tarnished reputation as a member
of the academe of good standing.
18.1) The net effect of respondents’ scheming act of
removing petitioner without cause and in serious violation of law, is contrary
to law, morals, good customs and public policy for which petitioner is entitled
to recover damages from respondents, their agents and representatives, jointly
and severally, as follows:
a) Exemplary damages in the amount of one million
pesos (P1,000,000.00), by way of example against persons, respondents
included, who in their personal and public capacities exceeded or abused their
authority coupled with grave disregard of human and property rights;
b) Moral damages in the amount of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00)
arising from the embarrassment, humiliation, sleepless nights, anxiety and
besmirched reputation as a consequence of [respondents’] illegal and tortious
acts, all in violation of petitioner’s rights.
c) Attorney’s fees in the amount of one hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00); and
d) Cost of litigation and other incidental expenses.[13]
Petitioner prayed, likewise, that he be granted the
following reliefs:
1) to issue upon receipt of this
petition a temporary restraining order directing the respondents, agents and/or
representatives to cease, desist and/or refrain from implementing the
resolution of the Board of Regents ousting or removing the petitioner as Member
thereof and from implementing the appointment of Mr. Raul I. Goco as Member of
the Board of Regents until the merits of this case shall have been finally and
judicially resolved;
2) to maintain the status quo by declaring petitioner to
continue discharging his functions and duties as Member of the Board of Regents
until the case is finally adjudicated; and
3) after
due hearing, judgment be issued:
a) to declare the appointment of petitioner still valid
and subsisting until its expiration in 2004 and that the resolution ousting
petitioner be declared null and void having been made without legal authority;
b) to declare the appointment of Mr. Raul I. Goco as null
and void ab initio.
4) to order
the respondents to pay, jointly and severally, to
the
petitioner:
a) Exemplary damages
- P1,000,000.00
b) Moral damages - P1,000,000.00
c) Attorney’s fees - P 100,000.00
which will be
duly proved during
the trial in
the
amounts
particularly specified herein.
5) to make the preliminary injunction heretofore
issued
final and
permanent.
Such other reliefs which this Honorable Court may deem
just and equitable.[14]
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[15]
the petition on the following grounds: (1) the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue
a writ of injunction to
enjoin the acts complained of, considering that the jurisdiction of regional
trial courts is limited to acts committed within the territorial boundaries of
their respective provinces and districts; (b) the allegations in the petition
make out a case for quo warranto; hence, petitioner has no cause of action for
injunction; and (c) the petition had been rendered moot and academic by the
lapse of petitioner’s six-year term.
On
Respondents filed a Supplement to Motion
to Dismiss[17] where
they averred that (a) the petitioner’s appointment was a mere “extension of
services,” which is beyond the power of the City Mayor to issue; (b) petitioner’s
appointment as member of the Board of Regents is invalid because the same was
not confirmed by the City Council; and (c) petitioner forfeited his office as
member of the Board of Regents upon his appointment as Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG) Undersecretary because he is barred from
simultaneously holding two offices.
Petitioner opposed the motions, contending
that (1) his petition for injunction was the proper remedy; (2) the court had
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction within the National Capital Region;
(3) he was not barred from holding the two positions as they are not
incompatible offices; and (3) contrary to the allegation of respondents, the
extension of his appointment as member of the Board of Regents had been
confirmed by the City Council.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration[18] of
the trial court’s Order issuing the TRO dated
The parties adduced testimonial and
documentary evidence during the hearing of the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction. On
On P200,000.00. Petitioner posted the required bond, upon
which a writ of preliminary injunction was issued on
On
It bears emphasis that matters on appointment of the
members of the Board of Regents, their term of office, the grounds for loss
thereof and the meetings of the board are covered or provided for in the Code
of PLM, the by-laws of the said educational institution, which appears to have
been violated. The Board of Regents is
the governing body of the PLM, exercising powers and duties enumerated in the
Code, the general powers set out in Section 13 of Act 1459 (Corporation Law)
and such other functions which are necessary to carry out the purposes of the
corporation and administration of the university. Pamantasan
ng Lungsod ng Maynila is a non-stock, non-profit corporation created for
education purpose by R.A. No. 4196.
Suffice it to state that the above controversy can be resolved through
reference to the charter and by-laws of the PLM. Evidently, the prayers for injunction and
damages are predicated on corporate matters.[23]
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[24] alleging
that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the case because the PLM is a chartered
institution and not a private corporation. Respondents opposed the motion and
alleged in their Rejoinder[25]
dated February 8, 2001 that since petitioner had not been reappointed as
Professorial Lecturer in the PLM College of Law, he was no longer qualified to
become a member of the Board of Regents; consequently, the case had become moot
and academic.
In his Sur-Rejoinder,[26]
petitioner alleged that the non-renewal of his appointment was a devious tactic
of respondents to effectively oust him from his membership in the Board of
Regents. He insisted that he remained a Board Member despite the non-renewal of
his appointment, especially since the RTC had issued a writ of preliminary
injunction in his favor.
On
Petitioner thus filed the instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court in which he raises the following issues:
1) Whether or
not the petitioner is entitled to his position as Member of the Board of
Regents representing the faculty until the expiration of his term on
Corollarily, may respondent Goco be validly appointed
to a position which is not vacant?
2) Whether or
not respondent Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of authority in appointing
respondent Goco as Member of the Board of Regents representing the faculty
knowing that the position is presently occupied by the petitioner.
3) Whether or
not respondent Chairman and Members of the Board of Regents is clothed with
authority to oust or remove petitioner as Member of the Board of Regents.[28]
The threshold issues before the Court
are whether the present recourse of petitioner under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court is proper, and whether the court a
quo erred in dismissing his petition for injunction on the sole ground that
it had been mooted by the non-renewal of his appointment as a Professorial
Lecturer at the PLM College of Law.
Petitioner admits that his appointment
as professor in the
Petitioner insists that his petition for
injunction has not been mooted, as he has the right to pursue and regain the
position from which he was ousted, and that the case remained justiciable and
proper for judicial action. Moreover, there was a continuing violation of his
right to security of tenure as a member of the Board of Regents. He reminds the
Court that the RTC had issued a Temporary Restraining Order, as well as a writ
of preliminary injunction. Furthermore,
the court had yet to reconsider his claims for moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees which he had yet to prove during trial. Petitioner cites the
ruling of this Court in Ticzon v. Video
Post Manila, Inc.,[29]
to buttress his contention.
For their part, respondents aver that
petitioner’s recourse is inappropriate because he raised factual issues in his
petition. They insist that petitioner should have appealed, by writ of error,
to the Court of Appeals instead of filing the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. On the merits of the petition,
respondents assert that, under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
there is no rule governing injunction as a cause of action. They aver that injunction
is merely an ancillary remedy to a principal action, and that the proper remedy
of the petitioner in the RTC was to file a petition for quo warranto. Thus, the issue of whether he is entitled to damages
has, likewise, become moot and academic. Respondents further contend that
petitioner cannot rely on the ruling of this Court in Ticzon because the cause of action in that case was for damages
with a plea for injunctive relief as an ancillary remedy. While petitioner
contends that he was illegally ousted as member of the Board of Regents and
thus entitled to injunctive relief, respondents insist that the petition had
been rendered moot and academic by the non-renewal of petitioner’s appointment
as professor in the PLM College of Law.
The petition is meritorious.
We agree with respondents’ contention
that the
As a rule, the remedy from a final
order is by writ of error to the Court of Appeals or a petition for review on certiorari to this Court under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court where only questions of law are raised or
involved.[31] The
test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating
the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a
question of fact.[32]
Applying the test to this case, it is
clear that the issue raised by petitioner is one of law: whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s complaint
for being moot and academic merely because he had not been reappointed as
Professorial Lecturer at the
The Court has ruled that an issue
becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial
relief to which the plaintiff would be entitled to and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the complaint.[33] However, a case should not be dismissed
simply because one of the issues raised therein had become moot and academic by
the onset of a supervening event, whether intended or incidental, if there are
other causes which need to be resolved after trial. When a case is dismissed without the other
substantive issues in the case having been resolved would be tantamount to a
denial of the right of the plaintiff to due process. It must be stressed that the
material allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
determine the nature of an action. The
designation of the nature of an action, or its title, is not meaningless or of
no effect in the determination of its purpose and object.[34]
A review of the allegations in the petition
for injunction and the reliefs prayed for therein will readily show that
petitioner had two causes of action: (1) for injunction; and (2) for moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees.
Injunction is a judicial writ,
process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a
certain act. It may be the main action
or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.[35]
The Court has distinguished the main action for injunction from the provisional
or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, thus:
The main action for injunction is distinct from the
provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist
except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for
injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory
or mandatory, may issue. Under the law,
the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction
which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy
of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be
heard. A preliminary injunction is
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order. It persists until it is dissolved
or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final
injunction.[36]
By praying for injunctive relief,
petitioner did not intend to correct a wrong of the past, for redress of injury
already sustained, but to prevent his ouster from membership in the Board. By
his action for injunction, petitioner sought to preserve the status quo of things, to prevent actual or
threatened acts which would violate the rules of equity and good conscience as
would consequently afford him a cause of action resulting from the failure of
the law to provide for an adequate or complete relief.[37]
Petitioner sought to enjoin the
respondents from enforcing the appointment of respondent Goco as member of the
Board of Regents representing the PLM faculty. He claimed that he was the
lawfully appointed member of the Board, and that respondent Goco should not be
allowed to assume the post and perform the duties and responsibilities
appurtenant thereto. Petitioner prayed that after hearing, the RTC render
judgment declaring respondent Goco’s appointment as null and void, and declaring
his (petitioner) appointment as valid and subsisting until its expiration in
2004.
As petitioner claimed in his petition,
respondent Mayor Atienza’s appointment of respondent Goco as member of the Board
was illegal, and that respondents acted “with evident bad faith, with
deliberate intention to ridicule, humiliate, dishonor, embarrass and place him
in a pitiful predicament causing him untold sufferings, sleepless nights,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and tarnished reputation as a member of the
academe of good moral standing, for which he is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.” Petitioner’s cause of action for moral and exemplary damages was for
redress for injury allegedly caused by respondents’ acts.
It must be stressed that the non-renewal
of the petitioner’s appointment as Professional Lecturer at the PLM College of
Law in the year 2001 did not render the petition in the RTC and the issues
raised therein moot and academic. For one thing, petitioner alleged that the
yearly reappointment of professional lecturers in the PLM was a matter of
policy. Moreover, petitioner had yet to
adduce evidence to prove his claim that the non-renewal by respondent Mayor
Atienza was a devious ploy to oust him from his membership in the Board of Regents
and to violate the then still effective writ of preliminary injunction issued against
respondents. The issue of whether respondents acted contrary to law and in
evident bad faith in appointing respondent Goco as member of the Board of
Regents representing the PLM faculty despite the absence of any vacancy in the
office, and the issue of whether the respondents Chairman and members of the Board
acted in evident bad faith in recognizing respondent Goco as the lawful member of
the Board of Regents during its January 28, 2000 meeting are valid issues which
the court a quo should have resolved. Also not to be ignored is petitioner’s claim
that respondent Goco had not taught at the PLM College of Law while serving as
Philippine Ambassador to Canada, and yet was appointed by respondent Mayor
Atienza to the position occupied by petitioner.
It may be alleged by respondents that
the issue of the validity of petitioner’s appointment has become moot and
academic considering that petitioner’s appointment as member of the Board of
Regents expired on
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Order of the RTC dated
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Records, Vol. 1, p. 114.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Records, Vol. II, pp. 292-295.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Rollo, pp. 328-329.
[29] 389 Phil. 20 (2000).
[30] Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday
Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 132.
[31] Rule 41, Section 2 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[32]
[33] Vda. de Dabao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116526, March 23, 2004, 426 SCRA 91, 97.
[34] International Flavors and Fragrances
(Phil.), Inc. v.
[35] Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, G.R.
No. 157494,
[36]
[37] Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 369 Phil. 641, 648 (1999).